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   IN MEMORIAM
On Monday, September 16, 2013 
50-year-old West Vancouver Police 
Constable Louis Reinhold Beglaw 
passed away after suffering  a 
medical emergency while on duty 
at the West Vancouver Police 
Department (WVPD)  Headquarters. 
Constable Beglaw was also a Major 
in the Canadian Army Militia with the Royal 
Westminster Regiment and took great pride in being 
the Officer Commanding  A Company. He had served a 
tour of duty in Bosnia in 2002 with the Multi National 
Divisional HQ and the Deputy Chief Planner for the 
Joint Military Affairs Section. Prior to becoming  a 
police officer, Constable Beglaw served as an Inspector 
with Canada Customs. 
In 2003 he achieved his dream of becoming  a  police 
officer by joining  the WVPD and in 2007 became a 
Police Service Dog  Handler. Constable Beglaw and his 
faithful partner and companion Police Service Dog 
‘Capone’ went on to become one of WVPD’s finest dog 
teams. He is survived by his wife and two children. 
Source: www.wvpd.ca
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Memorial Run (5km & 10 km) and Barbeque
November 17, 013
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice  Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The 4 disciplines of execution:  achieving your 
wildly important goals.
Chris McChesney, Sean Covey and Jim Huling.
London, UK: Simon & Schuster, 2012.
HD 30.28 M34 2012
The consumer learner:  emerging expectations of 
a customer service mentality in  post-secondary 
education.
Gillian Silver and Cheryl Lentz.
Las Vegas, NV: Pensiero Press, c2012.
LC 5225 A36 S55 2012
Creating  significant learning  experiences:  an 
integrated approach to designing college courses.
L. Dee Fink.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, [2013.]
LB 2331 F495 2013
Decisive:  how to make better choices in life and 
work.
Chip Heath and Dan Heath.
Toronto, ON: Random House Canada, [2013].
BF 448 H42 2013
Doing  more with teams:  the new way to winning. 
Bruce Piasecki.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., [2013].
HD 66 P52 2013
Ethics in action:  making  ethical  decisions in your 
daily life.
Jane Ann McLachlan.
Toronto, ON: Pearson Canada, c2010.
BJ 1521 M35 2009
Leadership conversations:  challenging  high 
potential managers to become great leaders.
Alan S. Berson and Richard G. Stieglitz.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2013.
HD 30.3 B476 2013
Managing  incompetence:  an innovative approach 
for dealing with people.
Gabriel Ginebra.
Alexandria, VA: ASTD Press, c2013.
HF 5549 G56 2013
Master presenter: lessons from the world's top 
experts on becoming a more influential speaker.
David Zielinski, editor.
San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, A Wiley Brand, [2013]
HF 5718.22 M326 2013
Needs assessment basics: a complete, how-to 
guide to help you: design effective, on-target 
training  solutions, get support, ensure bottom-
line impact.
Deborah D. Tobey.
Alexandria, VA: ASTD Press, c2005.
HF 5549.5 T7 T59 2005
Own the room: discover your signature voice to 
master your leadership presence.
Amy Jen Su and Muriel Maignan Wilkins.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, [2013].
HD 57.7 S82 2013
Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and 
mixed methods approaches.
John W. Creswell.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, c2014.
H 62 C6963 2014
Simply managing: what managers do and can do 
better.
Henry Mintzberg.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 
[2013].
HD 31 M457 2013
www.10-8.ca
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ARREST	 CANNOT	 BE	 SAVED	 BY	 
INFORMATION	 OF	 ANOTHER	 
OFFICER
R. v. Czajkowski, 2013 QCCA 1311
An informant told police that the 
accused (aka. Miami Mike) was going 
to carry out a “burn” - a  home 
invasion to steal money and drugs. It 
was reported that this would occur 
the following  day at an unknown location. Shortly 
before the burn, the informant said the accused 
would be arriving  at a specific Tim Hortons 
restaurant in a  blue Chrysler 300 to meet his 
accomplices, a few black men, in order to finalize 
their plans. This information was passed on to a 
detective who arranged for surveillance and SWAT 
teams to take up  positions near the Tim Hortons the 
next day. From 10:46 am they kept watch on a black 
man (Walker)  who arrived in a black Chevrolet 
Malibu. At 12:27 pm, a blue Chrysler 300 drove into 
the parking  lot. A white man (later identified as the 
accused)  and a black man (Samuels)  exited the 
Chrysler 300 and went inside the Tim Hortons. The 
driver (Robinson), another black man, stayed alone 
in the vehicle. At 12:31 pm, Walker left the Tim 
Hortons, sat in the front passenger seat of the 
Chrysler 300 and spoke briefly with Robinson. A few 
minutes later Walker returned to the Tim Hortons. 
Robinson followed but returned to the vehicle after 
three  minutes. At 12:47 pm, the remaining  men left 
the Tim Hortons. The accused entered the front 
passenger seat of the Chrysler 300, while  Samuels 
sat in the back and Robinson sat in the drivers seat. 
Walker went back inside the Tim Hortons.
Moments later a SWAT van blocked the back of the 
vehicle and police officers ordered the occupants to 
put their hands up. Robinson and Samuels complied 
immediately while the accused fidgeted in his seat, 
moved his shoulders from left to right and leaned 
towards the driver's seat. Police broke the front 
passenger window and the men were arrested. A 
vehicle search produced a black and grey tuque 
near the centre console on the driver's side. A 9mm 
semi-automatic pistol and two cartridge magazines, 
one with 11 bullets and the other with 12 bullets, 
were found inside the tuque.
Court of Quebec
The accused sought to exclude the 
evidence on the basis that there were 
insufficient grounds for his arrest and 
search of the vehicle. But the judge found 
that the police officers had reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the occupants of the vehicle would be 
involved in a home invasion. Therefore, the police 
could detain the men (which was not arbitrary) and 
the vehicle search was reasonable. The judge found 
the accused’s guilt was the only rational inference to 
be drawn from the circumstantial evidence  and he 
was convicted of several weapons offences. He was 
sentenced to 5 years in prison less 26½ months 
credited to pre-trial custody. 
Quebec Court of Appeal
The accused contended that his 
arrest was unlawful. In his view, the 
information possessed by the 
detective did not meet the standard 
required for an arrest (reasonable grounds to 
believe).
Arrest - Reasonable Grounds to Believe
The Crown acknowledged that the police officers 
arrested the vehicle occupants and did not detain 
them solely for investigative purposes. Thus, the 
Crown conceded that the “reasonable grounds to 
believe” standard applied rather than the lower 
“It is settled law that an arresting officer must have reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that an indictable offence has been committed or is about to be committed (s. 495 
Cr. C.) and that such grounds must be objectively justifiable. There is also a subjective 
component to the requirement, in that the police officer must actually believe that s/he has 
sufficient grounds to proceed to an arrest.”
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“reasonable grounds to suspect” standard used by 
the trial judge. 
The Court of Appeal then described the test for 
determining  whether there  were reasonable grounds 
for arrest:
It is settled law that an arresting  officer must 
have reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that an indictable offence has been 
committed or is about to be committed (s. 495 
Cr. C.) and that such grounds must be 
objectively justifiable. There is also a subjective 
component to the requirement, in that the police 
officer must actually believe that s/he has 
sufficient grounds to proceed to an arrest. 
[endnotes omitted, para. 19]
When several officers are involved in an arrest, “it is 
the police officer who makes the decision to arrest 
who must possess reasonable  grounds, as opposed 
to an officer who simply  executes the  order,” said 
Chief Justice Hesler. “The information possessed by 
each individual officer cannot be combined or 
‘pooled’ in assessing  reasonable and probable 
grounds. A decision to arrest made by an officer 
without sufficient grounds cannot be saved by the 
sufficient information possessed by another officer.”
In this case, even if the higher standard of 
reasonable grounds to believe was used and only the 
information possessed by the detective was assessed, 
the requisite standard had been met. The informant 
was credible (having  provided reliable information 
on six or seven prior occasions), the information was 
sufficiently specific and compelling  to exclude the 
possibility of a simple coincidence or a mere  rumour 
and the details were  amply corroborated  by  police 
surveillance. As the Chief Justice noted, “it is not 
necessary, as a  general rule, that a  tip be confirmed 
in its ‘criminal’ aspect.” Here, based on the totality 
of the circumstances, “a reasonable person placed in 
the position of [the detective] would have had 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an 
indictable offence was about to be committed.”
As for the detective’s subjective belief that he had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the occupants of the 
vehicle, it was sufficient. Although he stated in 
cross-examination that he had not obtained a 
Compelling Tip?          
Degree of Detail 
• The detective knew the accused’s alias ("Miami 
Mike") as well as his basic physical description. 
• He knew "Miami Mike" was expected to meet 
three or four black men at that particular Tim 
Hortons restaurant on that particular date and at 
that particular time, to finalize plans for a "burn". 
• He knew to expect a blue Chrysler 300. 
• “Even accepting that he may not have 
known the licence plate number, the 
information was sufficiently specific and 
compelling to warrant the attention of the 
police. It would be difficult to accept a 
police decision to do nothing in such 
circumstances.”
Corroboration?             
Confirming the Tip’s Details
• A blue Chrysler 300 carrying a white man and 
two black men arrived at the Tim Hortons on the 
expected date at the expected time. 
• The occupants later talked with another black 
man who was waiting at the Tim Hortons. It could 
not be mere coincidence. 
• The detective was told that they would 
imminently conduct a "burn"; he could 
consequently infer that they would be armed.
• “[S]ince the police knew the informant, it 
was unnecessary for the surveillance team 
to confirm details relating to the specific 
criminal activity being planned in order to 
justify the arrest.”
“[I]t is the police officer who makes the decision to arrest who must possess reasonable 
grounds, as opposed to an officer who simply executes the order. The information 
possessed by each individual officer cannot be combined or ‘pooled’ in assessing 
reasonable and probable grounds. A decision to arrest made by an officer without sufficient 
grounds cannot be saved by the sufficient information possessed by another officer.”
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warrant because the situation was urgent and there 
were insufficient grounds, the detective directed the 
arrest only after the surveillance team confirmed 
that the occupants of the vehicle could be the 
suspects. “Read in context, what the transcript shows 
is that [the detective] thought that it was impossible 
to obtain a telewarrant due to the urgency of the 
situation, since it was only after the surveillance 
team confirmed the information provided by the 
informant that he acquired reasonable grounds, and 
by then, it was indeed too late  to obtain a 
telewarrant,” said the Chief Justice. 
The arrest was legal and the vehicle search was 
lawful under the common law power of search 
incidental to arrest. There were no s. 8 or 9 Charter 
breaches. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ODOUR	 PLUS	 PROVIDES	 
GROUNDS	 FOR	 ARREST
R. v. Taylor, 2013 BCCA 382
 
Police stopped the accused for 
driving  his Jeep  with frosted windows 
(obscured visibility). When the officer 
approached the driver’s side of the 
vehicle he saw that the accused was 
manipulating  the window (rolled it down and then 
back up) as if trying  to hide something. The officer 
believed he also saw a fan, pipe and black 
landscaping  carpet in the vehicle’s interior. A strong 
odour of vegetative marihuana was detected 
emanating  from the vehicle through the partially 
(about 3”)  open window. The officer, having 
considerable experience in investigating  drug 
offences, could identify and distinguish the smells of 
fresh (vegetative) and burned marihuana. He 
described the odour as “overwhelming”, “pungent” 
and thus indicative of a  large quantity. He 
concluded the accused was attempting  to hide the 
smell of what was likely in the vehicle. The officer 
also noted that the accused’s eyes were bloodshot. 
He was arrested for possessing  marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking, directed to step from the 
vehicle and searched for drugs and weapons. The 
vehicle was also searched and a black liquor bag 
containing  a  package of vacuum-sealed marihuana 
weighing  232 grams was found, but no odour 
emanated from this bag. Other items, including  fans 
and nets with what was believed to be  marihuana 
residue, were also located in the vehicle. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused submitted that he was 
unlawfully  arrested and his vehicle 
illegally searched, thus breaching  his ss. 
8  and 9 Charter rights. In his view, the 
odour of marihuana alone, as a matter of law, was 
insufficient to justify  a warrantless arrest. The judge, 
however, concluded that the smell of vegetative 
marihuana was a sufficient basis to support an arrest 
made under either s.  495(1)(a)  - on reasonable 
grounds - or s. 495(1)(b)  - finds committing. She 
accepted that the strong  odour of vegetative 
marihuana as described by the officer, among other 
observations, formed the basis for his reasonable 
belief that the driver possessed marihuana. The arrest 
was lawful and the source of the odour was 
immaterial in determining  whether the arrest was 
valid. The accused was convicted of possessing 
marihuana and was given a 12-month conditional 
discharge. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The appeal judge found that the trial 
judge did not err in concluding  that the 
arrest was lawful.  There is a distinction 
between the odour of burnt marihuana 
and the odour of vegetative marihuana.  Plus, this 
was not a marihuana odour only case. In addition to 
the odour, the officer had made a number of other 
observations. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
The accused sought leave to appeal the 
British Columbia Supreme Court ruling. 
But Court of Appeal Justice Low refused 
to grant leave. “I am not persuaded that 
this is a  case in which it can be argued that the 
appeal judge erred in determining  that the trial judge 
did not err in finding  that there were surrounding 
circumstances that made the strong  smell of 
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vegetative marihuana a legally sound basis for the 
arrest and search,” he said. Each case depends on its 
own particular facts:
[The accused] wants this court to make it a 
proposition of law that the odour of marihuana 
alone can never be sufficient to found a lawful 
arrest and search.  I do not consider that to be a 
proposition of law and I do not see how the 
argument could succeed.  In a particular case, if 
the dominant fact supporting the arrest is the 
odour of marihuana (as it usually will be), the 
question would be whether the evidence in its 
entirety was sufficient to support the conclusion 
that the arresting police officer acted objectively.  
Each case must be decided on its particular 
constellation of facts and circumstances, not on 
a general binding appellate judicial statement as 
to what evidence is or is not sufficient in all 
cases.    
[The accused] wants this court to isolate a 
dominant fact and turn it into a proposition of 
law.  I do not think it is any more a viable 
proposition of law to state that marihuana odour 
alone cannot form the basis for a lawful arrest 
and search than it would be to state that such 
odour alone must always be found to be the 
basis for a lawful arrest and search.  [paras. 
16-17]
The accused’s application for leave to appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
GROUNDS	 BASED	 ON	 
CUMULATIVE	 EFFECT,	 NOT	 
PIECEMEAL	 ANALYSIS
R. v. Crowther & Pastuck, 2013 BCCA 364
In the early morning  hours, two 
residents of a townhouse complex 
called police after they saw a man 
being  dragged by his ankles and 
“stomped on” by two or three other 
men. Police arrived within minutes and found the 
victim behind the complex badly beaten. It had 
been raining  outside and the area was muddy. They 
heard someone shout, “Shut the fuck up,” and saw a 
light on in a nearby townhouse. An officer 
approached the townhouse and saw the accused 
Crowther, who he recognized as being  involved in 
the area’s notoriously violent drug  trade, standing  at 
an open window. There  was a party at the 
townhouse and other people were inside. The officer 
asked Crowther to come to the door and talk but he 
did not respond. Instead, he tried to close the 
window. Then Crowther and the others headed 
toward the front door. When police made their way 
to the front door the people in the unit moved 
upstairs. The officer believed Crowther had been 
involved in the assault and kicked in the front door 
for the purpose of preserving  evidence and 
preventing  potential witnesses from being  harmed. 
Crowther was found hiding  under a mattress and 
Pastuck was hiding  behind a woman in a closet. 
Both men were wearing  wet, muddy pants and were 
arrested. After the arrest, police saw blood on their 
clothes; Crowther had a blood-stained sock. The 
victim died three days later and the accuseds were 
charged with murder. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge found the officer had good 
reason to believe that if he did not 
immediately enter the premises evidence 
would be destroyed. But she ruled there 
was no statutory authorization or common law 
justification for the warrantless entry. Nevertheless, 
despite the illegal entry, the judge found the arrests 
justified. The officer subjectively had reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the arrests and they were 
“I do not think it is any more a viable 
proposition of law to state that marihuana 
odour alone cannot form the basis for a 
lawful arrest and search than it would be 
to state that such odour alone must 
always be found to be the basis for a 
lawful arrest and search.”
“[T]here were surrounding circumstances 
that made the strong smell of vegetative 
marihuana a legally sound basis for the 
arrest and search.”
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objectively supportable. Both men had fled from 
police, hid in the residence (mere feet away from the 
victim) and it was wet and muddy outside (their 
jeans were wet and muddy). The blood and DNA 
evidence (which matched the victim)  were admitted 
under s. 24(2)  of the Charter despite  the 
unreasonable warrantless entry. This, and other 
evidence, led to convictions of manslaughter. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accuseds argued, among  other 
grounds, that the trial judge erred 
in f i nd ing  r ea sonab le and 
probable grounds for arrest. It was 
submitted that the totality of the circumstances did 
not form a sufficient factual nexus to satisfy the 
objective test. 
Justice Bennett, authoring  the unanimous decision, 
first noted that “the  requirement for a police officer 
to have reasonable  grounds before arrest without a 
warrant protects the citizenry from arbitrary police 
conduct, while  at the same time, protecting  society 
from crime.” The test for reasonable grounds requires 
the arresting  officer subjectively have reasonable 
grounds on which to base the arrest and those 
grounds must be justifiable from an objective point 
of view: 
The assessment of reasonable grounds is made 
on the basis of the cumulative effect of the 
evidence, not on a piecemeal analysis. Each 
factor standing alone may not achieve grounds 
for arrest, but the question is whether together 
there are sufficient objective grounds. It is 
important to keep in mind the purpose of 
requiring objectively reasonable grounds − to 
prevent arbitrary arrests. [para. 34]
Justice Bennett found the officer had sufficient 
reasonable grounds to justify the arrests under s. 495 
of the Criminal Code. Therefore, the  arrests were not 
arbitrary. The objective grounds included:
• Both men fled when the police approached the 
premises. 
• Both men took significant steps to conceal 
themselves inside the residence. 
• Despite being  at a house party, both men were 
wearing  wet and muddy pants as if they had 
recently been outside  where it was wet and 
muddy. 
• The victim had been beaten in a wet and 
muddy area in very close proximity to the 
townhouse where the men had been minutes 
before the officer entered the house.
The Court of Appeal also found the trial judge’s s. 24
(2)  admissibility analysis resulting  from the s. 8 
Charter  breach (warrantless entry)  was amply 
supported by the  evidence. Further, a request for a 
stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) was inappropriate. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Editor’s note: The accuseds did not argue that the 
trial judge should have excised the grounds obtained 
as a result of the warrantless entry  from 
consideration in determining  whether the arrest was 
justified.
Note-able	 Quote
“Without rules there is no order, without order there 
is no safety, without safety there is no freedom.”  - 
Leanne Novakowski
“The assessment of reasonable grounds is 
made on the basis of the cumulative effect 
of the evidence, not on a piecemeal 
analysis. Each factor standing alone may 
not achieve grounds for arrest, but the 
question is whether together there are 
sufficient objective grounds.”
“The requirement for a police officer to 
have reasonable grounds before arrest 
without a warrant protects the citizenry 
from arbitrary police conduct, while at the 
same time, protecting society from crime.”
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REASONABLE	 SUSPICION	 
SUFFICES	 FOR	 DOG	 SNIFF
R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49
A drug  enforcement team at the 
Halifax Airport checked the electronic 
passenger list of an overnight 
Vancouver, BC to Halifax, NS Westjet 
flight. The accused was one of the last 
passengers to purchase a ticket, paid for it with cash 
and checked one bag. These factors led police to 
suspect he  was a possible drug  courier based on a 
profile that couriers often travel alone on overnight 
flights, purchase a last minute, walk-up  ticket in cash 
and check a single bag. Officers removed his 
luggage, along  with nine other passenger bags, and 
had them searched by a drug-sniffing  dog. The dog 
indicated a positive hit and the accused’s luggage 
was returned to the conveyor belt.  When he 
collected his bag, he was arrested for drug 
possession. The locked bag  was forced open, 
manually searched and three kilograms of cocaine 
was found. The accused was then re-arrested for 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 
The judge ruled that the accused had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
checked luggage but the police lacked a 
reasonable suspicion to deploy the drug 
sniffing  dog. He found that only the  purchase of the 
ticket with cash, perhaps at the last minute, could be 
viewed as suspicious. The remainder of the factors 
relied upon were open to several neutral 
explanations. In the judge’s view, the police  failed to 
further investigate or consider exculpatory 
explanations for the other factors. Since there were 
other potential innocent explanations that could 
have been revealed through further investigation, 
absent such investigation there could be no 
reasonable suspicion of involvement in drug  crimes. 
The judge held that the police were, at best, 
operating  on intuition  or an educated  guess. The 
unauthorized sniff search was unreasonable under s. 
8  of the Charter and the evidence was excluded 
under s. 24(2). The accused was acquitted.
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
Although the accused retained a 
privacy interest in his suitcase, the 
Court of Appeal found the trial 
judge erred by considering  each 
factor used by police  in isolation. Rather than 
finding  potential innocent explanations for each 
individual factor, the proper test was to determine 
whether all of the circumstances, looked at in their 
totality, provided a reasonable suspicion. Whether or 
not additional steps could have been taken to 
buttress the grounds supporting  reasonable suspicion 
was irrelevant; the police need only demonstrate 
they have done enough to establish reasonable 
suspicion. In this case, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the  police did have sufficient 
reasonable suspicion to use the drug  sniffing  dog. 
With the positive indication, police then had 
reasonable grounds to believe  the accused was in 
possession of illegal drugs. His arrest was lawful and 
the search of his suitcase was reasonable. There 
were no Charter breaches and a new trial was 
ordered.
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused argued that police 
applied the reasonable suspicion 
standard in a way that would 
authorize generalized searches of a 
very large number of travellers. It 
was submitted that the mechanical application of 
profile characteristics would capture a high 
percentage of innocent people  or racially 
marginalized groups. Instead, it was suggested that 
the police should have to conduct further 
investigation of individual factors relied upon that 
were neutral, innocuous and capable of innocent 
explanation. Thus, the accused contended that the 
police failed to satisfy the reasonable suspicion 
standard.
“The reasonable suspicion standard requires that the entirety of the circumstances, 
inculpatory and exculpatory, be assessed to determine whether there are objective 
ascertainable grounds to suspect that an individual is involved in criminal behaviour.” 
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What is Reasonable Suspicion?
A unanimous nine member Supreme Court found 
there  was no need to revise the reasonable suspicion 
standard, holding  it was robust, determined on the 
totality  of the circumstances, based on objectively 
discernible facts and subject to independent and 
rigorous judicial scrutiny. In the Court’s view, the 
reasonable suspicion standard prevents the 
indiscriminate and discriminatory  exercise of police 
powers. “The reasonable suspicion standard requires 
that the entirety  of the circumstances, inculpatory 
and exculpatory, be assessed to determine whether 
there  are objective ascertainable grounds to suspect 
that an individual is involved in criminal behaviour,” 
said Justice Karakatsanis, authoring  the Court’s 
opinion. “It does not require the police to investigate 
to rule out exculpatory circumstances.” 
As a  result of this case, the Supreme Court 
highlighted the following legal principles:
✦ Using  a dog  trained to detect certain kinds of 
illegal drugs using  its sense of smell is a  search 
tha t does no t requ i re p r io r jud ic ia l 
authorization (a warrant).
  
✦ The common-law authorizes the deployment of 
a drug-sniffing dog.
✦ Sniff searches are minimally  intrusive, narrowly 
targeted and highly accurate.
✦ To deploy a sniffer dog  the police must have a 
reasonable  suspicion based on objective, 
ascertainable facts that evidence of an offence 
will be discovered. 
✦ The Crown bears the burden of showing  that 
the objective  facts rise to the level of 
reasonable suspicion such that a  reasonable 
person, standing  in the shoes of the police 
officer, would have  held a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity.
✦ The constellation of facts must be based in the 
evidence, tied to the individual and capable  of 
supporting  a logical inference of criminal 
behaviour.  The constellation of factors must be 
assessed at the time of the search, not after. If 
the link between the constellation and 
criminality cannot be  established by way of a 
logical inference, the Crown must lead 
evidence (empirical or statistical or based upon 
the investigating  officer’s training  and 
experience)  to connect the circumstances to 
criminality:
An officer’s training and experience may 
provide an objective experiential, as 
opposed to empirical, basis for grounding 
reasonable suspicion. However, this is not 
to say that hunches or intuition grounded 
in an officer’s experience will suffice, or 
that deference is owed to a police officer’s 
view of the circumstances based on her 
training  or experience in the field. A police 
officer’s educated guess must not supplant 
the rigorous and independent scrutiny 
demanded by the reasonable suspicion 
standard. Evidence as to the specific 
nature and extent of such experience and 
training  is required so that the court may 
make an objective assessment of the 
probative link between the constellation of 
factors relied on by the police and 
criminality.  The more general the 
constellation relied on by the police, the 
more there will be a need for specific 
evidence regarding police experience and 
training.  To the extent that specific 
evidence of the investigating  officer’s 
experience and training supports the link 
the Crown asks the court to draw, the more 
compelling that link will be. [reference 
omitted, para. 47]
“An officer’s training and experience may provide an objective experiential, as opposed to 
empirical, basis for grounding reasonable suspicion. However, this is not to say that hunches 
or intuition grounded in an officer’s experience will suffice, or that deference is owed to a 
police officer’s view of the circumstances based on her training or experience in the field. A 
police officer’s educated guess must not supplant the rigorous and independent scrutiny 
demanded by the reasonable suspicion standard.”
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✦ Th e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r o b j e c t i v e a n d 
ascertainable facts permits an independent 
after-the-fact review by the court and protects 
against arbitrary state action.
✦ The police must point to particularized conduct 
or particularized evidence of criminal activity. 
However, the evidence need not itself consist 
of unlawful behaviour or evidence of a specific 
known criminal act.
✦ Reasonable suspicion (aka. reasonable grounds 
to suspect)  addresses the possibility of 
uncovering  criminality. It is a lower and less 
demanding  s tandard than reasonable 
probability (aka. reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe, reasonable grounds to 
believe), which addresses the probability  of 
uncovering criminality.
✦ Since reasonable suspicion deals with 
possibilities, innocent people may in some 
cases be reasonably suspected of a crime. 
✦ Reasonable suspicion must be assessed against 
the totality of the circumstances: 
Th e i n q u i r y m u s t c o n s i d e r t h e 
constellation of objectively discernible 
facts that are said to give the investigating 
officer reasonable cause to suspect that an 
individual is involved in the type of 
criminal activity under investigation.  This 
inquiry must be fact-based, flexible, and 
grounded in common sense and practical, 
everyday experience. A police officer’s 
grounds for reasonable suspicion cannot 
be assessed in isolation. [reference 
omitted, para. 29]
Exculpatory, neutral, or equivocal 
information cannot be disregarded when 
assessing a constellation of factors.  The 
totality of the circumstances, including 
favourable and unfavourable factors, must 
be weighed in the course of arriving at any 
conc lus ion rega rd ing  reasonab le 
suspicion. [para. 33]
✦ Some factors, on their own, will be insufficient 
to support a  reasonable suspicion, but can 
nonetheless be used as one part of a 
constellation of factors: 
While some factors, such as travelling 
under a false name, or flight from the 
police, may give rise to reasonable 
suspicion on their own, other elements of 
a constellation will not support reasonable 
suspicion, except in combination with 
other factors.  Generally, characteristics 
that apply broadly to innocent people are 
insufficient, as they are markers only of 
generalized suspicion. The same is true of 
factors that may “go both ways”, such as 
an individual’s making  or failing to make 
eye contact.  On their own, such factors 
cannot support reasonable suspicion; 
however, th i s does not prec lude 
reasonable suspicion arising when the 
same factor is simply one part of a 
constellation of factors. [para. 31]
✦ Since the reasonable suspicion standard 
addresses the possibility of uncovering 
criminality, it need not be the only inference 
that can be drawn from a  particular 
constellation of factors. Factors that give rise to 
a reasonable suspicion may also support 
completely innocent explanations. 
     
✦ The obligation of the police to take all factors 
into account does not impose a duty on them 
to undertake further investigation to seek out 
alternative or possible innocent explanations 
for constellations of factors giving  rise to 
reasonable suspicion. 
✦ Reasonable suspicion does not descend to the 
level of a “generalized suspicion” - a suspicion 
that attaches to a particular activity  or location 
rather than a specific person:
A constellation of factors will not be 
sufficient to ground reasonable suspicion 
where it amounts merely to a ‘generalized’ 
“Exculpatory, neutral, or equivocal information cannot be disregarded when assessing a 
constellation of factors. The totality of the circumstances, including favourable and 
unfavourable factors, must be weighed in the course of arriving at any conclusion regarding 
reasonable suspicion.”
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suspicion because it ‘would include such a 
number of presumably innocent persons as 
to approach a subjectively administered, 
random basis’ for a search. [para. 30]
In conclusion, Justice Karakatsanis stated:
In sum, when single-profile narcotic dogs are 
deployed on the basis of reasonable suspicion, 
the police intrusion must be connected to factors 
indicating  a drug-related offence.  Reasonable 
suspicion does not, however, require the police 
to point to a specific ongoing crime, nor does it 
entail the identification of the precise illegal 
substance being searched for. The reasonable 
suspicion held by the police need only be linked 
to the possession, traffic, or production of drugs 
or other drug-related contraband. [para. 37]
Profiling 
Whether or not reasonable suspicion has been met 
depends on the particular circumstances of each 
case. As for drug  courier profiles, the  Supreme Court 
cautioned about using profiles in general terms:
In my view, it is unhelpful to speak of profiling 
as generating reasonable suspicion.  The term 
itself suggests an assessment based on 
stereotyping and discriminatory factors, which 
have no place in the reasonable suspicion 
analysis.  Rather, the analysis must remain 
focused on one central question: Is the totality of 
the circumstances, including the specific 
characteristics of the suspect, the contextual 
factors, and the offence suspected, sufficient to 
reach the threshold of reasonable suspicion?
The application of the reasonable suspicion 
standard cannot be mechanical and formulaic. It 
must be sensitive to the particular circumstances 
of each case.  Characteristics identified by a 
police profile can be considered when 
evaluating  reasonable suspicion; however, 
profile characteristics are not a substitute for 
objective facts that raise a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity.  Profile characteristics must 
be approached with caution precisely because 
they risk undermining a careful individualized 
assessment of the totality of the circumstances.
In this case, the profiling alleged consisted of a 
set of factors that the officers had been taught to 
look for and had learned through experience to 
l o o k f o r i n o r d e r t o d e t e c t d r u g 
couriers. Whether or not these factors give rise 
to reasonable suspicion will depend upon a 
police officer’s reasons for relying on specific 
factors, the evidence connecting these factors to 
criminal activity, and the entirety of the 
circumstances of the case. [paras. 39-41]
Was There Reasonable Suspicion?
Here, based on their training  and experience with 
prior investigations, the police relied collectively 
upon nine factors in their decision to deploy the 
drug sniffing dog:
• the travel was on a one-way ticket; 
• the flight originated in Vancouver; 
• the accused was travelling alone; 
• the ticket was purchased with cash; 
• the ticket was the last one  purchased before the 
flight departed; 
• the accused checked one piece of luggage; 
• the flight was overnight; 
• the flight took place mid-to late-week; and 
• drug  couriers prefer less expensive airlines, 
such as WestJet.  
Plus, in her cross-examination, the officer gave 
evidence that people meeting  this constellation had 
been proven to be drug couriers in the past.
The Supreme Court agreed that the trial judge erred 
by assessing  the factors individually, rather than in 
their entirety. When the factors were viewed in their 
totality, the police had a reasonable suspicion that 
they would discover evidence of a  drug-related 
crime in the accused’s luggage and the sniff search 
was justified. The sniff search was reasonable  and 
the positive indication by the dog  then raised the 
reasonable suspicion standard to reasonable and 
probable grounds for arrest. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and the order 
for a new trial was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
www.10-8.ca
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SUPREME	 COURT	 SPLIT	 ON	 
WHETHER	 REASONABLE	 
SUSPICION	 SATISFIED
R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50 
Clocking  the accused on radar at 112 
km/h in a 110 km/h zone over the 
crest of a  hill, police saw the front end 
of his car pitch forward and it slowed 
to 89 km/h. Wanting  to warn him 
about speeding, the  officers made a u-turn and 
found him pulled over on his own, parked at the 
roadside two kilometers down the highway. Without 
apparent prompting, the accused said he was “sorry” 
and that he knew he had been speeding. The officer 
confirmed speeding  as the reason for the stop  and 
asked for the accused’s driver’s licence and vehicle 
registration, which were provided. The accused’s 
hands were shaky and trembling, he was sweating, 
breathing  very rapidly, his carotid artery was quickly 
pulsing  and his eyes had a pinkish colour to them. 
When asked if he was all right, the accused sought 
and took some asthma medication which did not 
result in any noticeable decrease in his rapid 
breathing. When asked about his trip, the accused 
said he was coming  from Calgary and going  to 
Regina, his home. He seemed to be somewhat 
confused on when he had traveled to Calgary. 
Even though a computer check came back negative, 
the officer suspected that the accused was involved 
in a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) 
offence based on his observations and experience, 
which included a  standardized field sobriety-testing 
(SFST)  course, Pipeline  and Advanced Pipeline 
training, and over 5,000 traffic stops involving  150 
discoveries of drugs. The accused was asked to step 
out of the vehicle, advised he was going  to be 
detained for further investigation and told of his 
Charter right to counsel. After a consent search was 
refused, a drug  sniffing  dog  was deployed and 
conducted a sniff-search around the exterior of the 
vehicle. The dog  indicated on the back hatch area 
and the accused was arrested. He was again given 
his rights. The vehicle was then manually searched 
and 31.5 pounds of marijuana in three gift-wrapped 
packages was found in the rear hatch area. The 
accused was charged with possessing  marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking.
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
An officer testified, based on his training 
and experience, that there were a number 
of factors leading  him to believe that the 
accused might be involved in a CDSA 
offence: 
(1) erratic driving - an overreaction to police 
presence (20 km/h below the speed limit and 
then parking at the roadside before police 
activated their lights); 
(2) extreme nervousness - the highest nervousness 
seen in a traffic stop which did not diminish 
despite the relatively minor reason for the stop;
(3) physical signs consistent with the marihuana 
use - a pinkish eye colour and muscle tremors; 
and
(4) travel on a known drug  pipeline - Calgary was a 
well known source of drugs which are typically 
moved from west to east, and the accused 
appeared somewhat confused about his trip 
(indicative of trying to make up a story very 
quickly at the side of the road). 
The judge concluded that the officer was, at best, 
acting  on a hunch  and his “opinions” did not meet 
the reasonable suspicion standard required for a 
valid sniffer dog  search. Since the  marihuana was 
obtained as a result of a  warrantless search based on 
inadequate grounds, the accused’s rights under s. 8 
of the Charter were breached and the evidence was 
excluded under s. 24(2). Without the marihuana as 
evidence, the accused was found not guilty.  
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal found the trial 
judge erred in discounting  the 
inferences drawn by the officer as 
mere “opinion” in determining 
whether there was reasonable suspicion that the 
accused was involved in a drug-related offence. In 
finding  this case “very  close to the  line”, the Court of 
Appeal was satisfied that the “constellation of 
objective factors” was sufficient to meet the 
“reasonable suspicion standard.” The sniffer-dog 
search was reasonable and the marihuana was 
lawfully obtained and therefore admissible. The 
accused’s acquittal was set aside and a new trial was 
ordered. 
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Supreme Court of Canada
Although the accused acknowledged that the police 
could detain him to investigate speeding  under 
Saskatchewan’s Traffic  Safety Act, he suggested that 
they could not further detain him to investigate drug 
offences because they  did not have reasonable 
grounds to suspect he  was connected to a particular 
criminal activity (drug-related offence). In this case, 
the Supreme Court was split (5:4) on the  application 
of the reasonable suspicion standard to the facts of 
the case. Five judges concluded that the police did 
have reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused 
was involved in a drug-related offence while four 
did not. 
Reasonable Suspicion Standard Satisfied
Justice Moldaver, writing  for 
himself and four other justices, 
concluded that the police had 
reasonable suspicion sufficient to 
independently justify  both the 
detention of the accused for further investigation and 
a sniffer-dog  search. In this case, the basis for the 
detention and the basis for the search were the same 
- reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused 
was involved in a drug related offence.  
The majority recognized, once again, that the 
“analysis of objective  reasonableness should be 
conducted through the lens of a  reasonable person 
‘standing  in the shoes of the police officer’.” Part of 
this meaningful analysis included an officer’s 
training or experience:
Officer training and experience can play an 
important role in assessing  whether the 
reasonable suspicion standard has been met.  
Police officers are trained to detect criminal 
activity. That is their job. They do it every day.  
And because of that, “a fact or consideration 
which might have no significance to a lay person 
can sometimes be quite consequential in the 
hands of the police”. Sights, sounds, movement, 
body language, patterns of behaviour, and the 
like are part of an officer’s stock in trade and 
courts should consider this when assessing 
whether their evidence, in any given case, 
passes the reasonable suspicion threshold. 
[reference omitted, para. 62]
However, police training  and experience should not 
be accepted uncritically  by the courts.  Nor is 
deference necessarily owed to a police officer’s view 
of the circumstances because of his or her training 
or experience in the field.  On the other hand, “the 
police [must] be allowed to carry out their duties 
without undue skepticism or the requirement that 
their every  move be  placed under a scanning 
electron microscope.” Nor must matters within the 
realm of police training  and experience require 
expert qualifications before  their testimony is 
accepted: 
Po l i c e o f f i c e r s n e e d n o t b e t r a i n e d 
pharmacologists or toxicologists or medical 
doctors before they can give evidence on the 
factors that their training  and experience has 
taught them provide reasonable grounds to 
suspect that someone is engaged in the use of 
drugs. [para. 57]
 
In finding  the officer’s subjective belief objectively 
reasonable, Justice Moldaver outlined a summary of 
applicable principles attaching  to the reasonable 
suspicion analysis:
• Reasonable suspicion must be assessed against 
the totality of the circumstances.
  
• Characteristics that apply broadly to innocent 
people and “no-win” behaviour — he looked at 
me, he did not look at me — cannot on their 
own, support a finding  of reasonable suspicion, 
although they may take on some value when 
they form part of a constellation of factors.
• Exculpatory, common, neutral, or equivocal 
information should not be discarded when 
assessing  a constellation of factors.  However, 
“Police officers need not be trained pharmacologists or toxicologists or medical doctors 
before they can give evidence on the factors that their training and experience has taught 
them provide reasonable grounds to suspect that someone is engaged in the use of drugs.”
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the test for reasonable suspicion will not be 
stymied when the factors which give rise to it 
are supportive of an innocent explanation.
  
• Reasonable suspicion looks to possibilities, not 
probabilities.  Are the  facts objectively 
indicative  of the possibility of criminal 
behaviour in light of the totality of the 
circumstances?   If so, the objective component 
of the test will have been met.  If not, the 
inquiry is at an end.
• Assessing  whether a particular constellation of 
facts gives rise to a reasonable suspicion must 
not devolve into a scientific or metaphysical 
exercise.  Common sense, flexibility, and 
practical everyday experience are the bywords, 
and they are to be applied through the eyes of a 
reasonable person armed with the knowledge, 
training  and experience of the investigating 
officer.
• The reasonable and probable grounds standard 
is a  more demanding  standard than the 
reasonable suspicion standard.  It follows 
inexorably from this that more innocent 
persons will be  caught under a reasonable 
suspicion standard than under the reasonable 
and probable grounds standard.  That is the 
logical consequence of the way these standards 
have been defined.
• The courts, under the banner of rigorous 
judicial oversight, must guard against upping 
the ante for reasonable suspicion to the point 
that it virtually mirrors the test for reasonable 
and probable  grounds. The  police need not 
have  evidence indicative of a reasonable 
probability of finding  drugs under a reasonable 
suspicion standard.  To require more would 
render the distinction between reasonable and 
probable grounds and reasonable suspicion all 
but illusory.
Here, the majority rejected the accused’s attempts to 
isolate and examine each indicator by itself and 
thereby dismiss them in the reasonable suspicion 
analysis. For example, the accused suggested: (1) 
erratic driving  (it is common for speeders to slow 
down quickly when they spot a police radar unit); 
(2)  nervousness (innocent people show signs of 
nervousness when they are stopped by the police); 
(3)  hand tremors (as consistent with nervousness as 
they are with marihuana use); (4)  pinkish-coloured 
eyes (many reasons apart from marihuana use); and 
(5)  travelling  route (many innocent people drive the 
Trans-Canada Highway from Calgary to Regina every 
day).  
The majority found the factors identified by the 
officer, through the lens of training  and field 
experience in the transportation and detection of 
drugs, provided the objective basis to support his 
belief that the accused might be  involved in a drug-
related offence:
• The accused’s noticeable and pronounced 
sudden decrease in speed;
• He pulled over to the side of the road on his 
own without being  directed by the  police to do 
so.
• His level of anxiety was “some of the highest 
nervousness” the officer had ever seen in 
making  thousands of traffic stops.  It was so 
pronounced that he ask the accused if he  was 
“all right”. 
• The requested asthma medication did not abate 
the extreme degree of nervousness even though 
he knew he  was being  investigated for a 
relatively minor speeding  infraction.  That 
seemed unusual especially in the context that a 
record search revealed the accused had no 
outstanding  tickets or violations that might 
account for his abnormal state of anxiety.
• From his training  and experience as a police 
officer, the pinkish eye colour and trembling 
hands were symptoms consistent with a 
marihuana user — hence the link  to drugs and 
the possibility that the accused was concealing 
drugs in his car.
• The accused was travelling  on the Trans-Canada 
Highway from Calgary to Regina. From training 
and experience, the officer knew that this 
stretch of highway was a drug  route.  Plus he 
slipped-up as to the day he left Regina to go to 
Calgary. 
• The officer knew that drug  traffickers tend to do 
fast turnarounds — which is precisely what the 
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accused admitted to, before attempting  to 
change his initial response to indicate he had 
spent more time in Calgary.  
Since the police had reasonable suspicion that the 
accused was involved in a drug-related offence, they 
could use a drug  dog  to perform a sniff search of the 
vehicle. There was no s. 8 Charter breach and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.  
 
Reasonable Suspicion Standard Not Satisfied 
Justice Lebel, authoring  a four 
member dissenting  decision, 
opined that the police lacked 
the requisite objective grounds 
for a reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog-sniff 
search. In her view, even taking  into account the 
officer’s training  and experience, the  constellation of 
factors available to the police, including  neutral and 
equivocal factors, were insufficient to ground 
reasonable suspicion:
The police in this case relied on markers that 
apply broadly to innocent people, or markers 
only of generalized suspicion, which were at 
best highly equivocal: slowing down upon sight 
of the police and pulling over after speeding; 
acting highly nervous when confronted by the 
police; sweating  on a warm day; breathing 
rapidly as an asthmatic; having pinkish eyes; 
using  the primary highway route to make a quick 
turnaround trip between two major cities; 
correcting an initial response when asked about 
travel dates; and lacking a criminal record.
When viewed collectively, the factors did not 
support objective grounds for a reasonable suspicion 
to detain or conduct the warrantless dog-sniff search 
of the vehicle. Thus, the search and post-traffic stop 
detention breached ss. 8  and 9 of the Charter. The 
minority would have upheld the trial judge’s 
decision to exclude the marihuana as evidence. 
Although the reliability  and importance of the 
evidence to the Crown’s case  favoured admission, 
the seriousness of police  conduct and the  impact of 
the breach on the accused’s Charter-protected 
interests favoured exclusion. The minority would 
have allowed the accused’s appeal. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
IS	 A	 FIREARM	 ALWAYS	 A	 
WEAPON?
R. v. Dunn, 2013 ONCA 539
 
A private investigator saw the 
accused pull a  pistol out of his jacket 
pocket, appear to point it at a man 
and then leave in his car. Police were 
called and attended the accused’s 
trailer where they found a black handgun resting  on 
a chair in a shed beside the trailer. The handgun was 
a Crosman Pro77 airgun that fired .177 calibre 
spherical BBs propelled by means of compressed air 
from a canister. It was fully  functional and loaded 
with a partly used CO2 cartridge. It had a warning 
on the side: “Warning, not a toy, misuse can cause 
fatal injury. Before  using read owner’s manual 
available from  Crosman Corp.” There was no 
ammunition in the magazine. The accused was 
charged with several offences including  handling  a 
firearm in a careless manner, 
carrying  a weapon for a 
purpose dangerous to the 
public peace and carrying  a 
concealed weapon.
 
Ontario Court of Justice
 
A firearms examiner testified that the 
airgun had an average velocity of 261.41 
feet per second (ft/s). He said this type of 
airgun could be purchased without 
producing  any documentation, as long  as the 
muzzle velocity did not exceed 500 ft/s. The expert 
also cited a scientific study (pig’s eye study)  which 
set a  standard for the capabilities of a barrelled 
object in causing  death or bodily injury. This study 
found that any shot exceeding  214 ft/s was capable 
of causing  serious injury to a pig’s eye. As well, the 
study determined that a projectile travelling  at 246 
ft/s would penetrate a pig’s eye 50% of the time 
(known as the V50 standard). 
 
The judge, noting  that the airgun was not a “real 
powder fired bullet shooting  gun,” ruled that the 
Crown was required to prove it was a weapon as 
defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. Since the 
Crown failed to prove that the airgun was used or 
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intended for use in causing  death or injury or to 
threaten or intimidate, the judge ruled that it was not 
a “weapon” and therefore not a “firearm.” The 
accused was acquitted.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
The Crown argued that a barrelled 
device that meets the Criminal 
Code  definition of “firearm” need 
not also meet the definition of 
“weapon.” This interpretative issue arose because 
each definition refers to the other and there were 
differing  views in the  case law about whether or not 
a “firearm” is always a weapon irrespective  of 
whether it meets the definition of “weapon” (by  its 
use or the intent of its possessor). Justice Rosenberg, 
writing  the unanimous decision, framed the question 
this way:
 
[B]ecause “firearm” is defined as “a barrelled 
weapon”, the question arises whether the 
prosecution must prove not only that the object 
discharges a shot, bullet or other projectile that 
is capable of causing serious bodily injury or 
death, but also that it meets subsections (a) or (b) 
in the definition of “weapon”; namely, that the 
object was used, designed to be used or 
intended for use in causing death or injury to 
any person or for the purpose of threatening  or 
intimidating  any person. Or, is the word 
“weapon” used in the definition of “firearm” 
only in a descriptive sense, such that it is not a 
formal element of the definition requiring  proof? 
The definition of “weapon”, in turn, refers to 
“firearm”.  The concluding  phrase in that 
definition, “without restricting the generality of 
the foregoing, includes a firearm”, appears to 
exclude the used, designed or intended for use 
requirements and deems a firearm to be a 
weapon.” [para. 16]
 
Since there were differing  case law decisions on this 
matter, a five (5) judge panel heard the case.
 
Is a Firearm Always a Weapon?
 
Justice Rosenberg, writing  the unanimous decision, 
ruled that the term “weapon” in the definition of 
“firearm,” was simply a descriptor and not a formal 
element. Thus, barreled objects meeting  the 
definition of “firearm” need not also meet the 
definition in paragraphs (a) or (b) of “weapon”:
In my view, … an object, whether it is a 
conventional powder-fired gun or a spring or gas 
fired gun, will fall within the definition of ‘firearm’ 
in s. 2 provided there is proof that any shot, bullet 
or other projectile can be discharged from the 
object and that it is capable of causing  serious 
bodily injury or death to a person. [para. 34]
Thus, the focus becomes the objects nature  as a 
barreled device and its capability  (to cause serious 
bodily injury or death).
BY THE BOOK:
Definitions: s. 2 Criminal Code
“weapon”  means any thing  used, designed  to be 
used or intended for use
(a) in causing death or injury to any person, or
(b) for the purpose of threatening  or 
intimidating any person
and,  without restricting  the generality of the foregoing, 
includes a firearm.
"firearm" means a barrelled  weapon  from which any shot, 
bullet  or other projectile can be discharged  and that is 
capable of causing  serious bodily injury or death to a 
person, and  includes any frame or receiver of such a 
barrelled  weapon and anything  that can be adapted for use 
as a firearm.
“[A]n object, whether it is a conventional powder-fired gun or a spring or gas fired gun, will 
fall within the definition of ‘firearm’ in s. 2 provided there is proof that any shot, bullet or 
other projectile can be discharged from the object and that it is capable of causing serious 
bodily injury or death to a person.”
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The Court of Appeal noted that certain weapons are 
deemed not to be firearms if the shot, bullet or other 
projectile does not exceed a  muzzle velocity of 
152.4 m/s (500 f/s). However, this velocity threshold 
deeming  weapons as non-firearms is only in relation 
to specific offences concerning  the strict licensing 
regime of the Firearms Act and Criminal Code  (eg. 
unauthorized possession, trafficking, importing/
exporting, failing  to report or false  reporting  of lost, 
found, or destroyed firearms). Other offences such as 
carrying  a concealed weapon (s. 90), careless 
handling  (s. 86), and possession for a dangerous 
purpose (s. 88)  are not subject to the 152.4 m/s 
threshold.
 
Justice Rosenberg  also examined the legislative 
scheme and found there were three different 
categories (or groups) of barrelled objects:
Group One: Barrelled objects shooting  a 
projectile with a velocity of less than 214 ft./s. 
(or 246 ft./s., using the V50 standard) are not 
firearms because they are not capable of serious 
injury or death; these objects will only be 
considered weapons, and thus fall within a 
prohibition such as the concealed weapon 
prohibition in s. 90, if they meet paras. (a) or (b) 
in the definition of “weapon”.
Group Two: Barrelled objects shooting  a 
projectile with a velocity of more than 214 ft./s. 
(or 246 ft./s., using  the V50 standard) are 
firearms, because they are capable of causing 
serious injury or death, whether or not they also 
meet paras. (a) or (b) in the definition of 
“weapon”; these weapons will fall within a 
prohibition such as that found in s. 90. 
Nevertheless, they will not be subject to the 
stricter licensing  regime in the Criminal Code 
and the Firearms Act if they fall within one of the 
exemptions in s. 84(3), for example, if the 
velocity of the projectile does not exceed 500 f/
s.
Group Three: Barrelled objects shooting a 
projectile with a velocity of more than 500 f./s. 
These objects fall within the definition of firearm 
for all purposes of the Criminal Code and the 
Firearms Act and must be licensed accordingly. 
Some airguns and most powder-fired bullet 
shooting  guns will fall with in this regime. At a 
minimum, … Group Three objects do not need 
to meet the para. (a) or (b) definition of weapon 
to be deemed to be weapons. [paras. 44-46]
 
The legislative history, its object (public safety)  and 
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words 
used also supported the Court’s view of its 
interpretation.
 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittals for careless handling  of a  firearm, carrying 
a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public 
peace and carrying  a concealed weapon were set 
aside and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Criminal Code sections where a barrelled weapon with a muzzle velocity of 
152.4 m/s or less is not  considered a “firearm” (see s. 84 (3)(d))
91 Unauthorized possession of firearm 101 Transfer firearm without authority
92 Possess firearm knowing possession unauthorized 103 Importing/exporting firearm knowing it is unauthorized
93 Possess firearm at unauthorized place 104 Unauthorized importing/exporting
94 Unauthorized possession of firearm in motor vehicle 105 Losing or finding without reporting or delivering
95 Possess prohibited/restricted firearm with ammunition 106 Destroying without reporting
99 Weapons trafficking 107 False statements concerning loss, theft or destruction
100 Possess firearm for the purpose of trafficking 117.03 Seizure on failure to produce authorization
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PRIVILEGE	 SURVIVES	 DEATH	 OF	 
INFORMER
R. v. Anderson, 2013 SKCA 92
The accused was originally arrested, 
along  with a number of other 
individuals, following  an extensive 
police investigation. Operation 
Avalanche resulted in two wiretap 
authorizations yielding  a number of incriminating 
conversations along  with more than 40 search 
warrants or search warrant-type orders being 
granted. He was released without charges being  laid 
but then, some nine months later, was re-arrested 
and charged with many drug related offences. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused brought forward several pre-
trial motions concerning  disclosure, 
including  a submission that the Crown 
was required to disclose  information on a 
deceased informant. He suspected that a  dead 
informant had provided information to police that 
was relied upon in search warrants and wiretaps. In 
his view, the parts of the warrants, authorizations 
and related disclosure pertaining  to this informant 
should have been unvetted because informer 
privilege ceased to exist upon death. He argued that 
his Charter rights were breached by this non-
disclosure and sought a  stay of proceedings under s. 
24(1). 
The judge rejected the accused’s argument without 
confirming  whether or not the  informant had died. 
“Informer privilege belongs jointly to the Crown and 
the informant and that neither can waive it without 
the consent of the other,” said the judge. “If that 
privilege is automatically  lost upon the informant’s 
death, it may have the effect of discouraging  would-
be informants from coming  forward. It is not much 
of a  stretch to think that the informant might be 
concerned about his own reputation after his death 
and about retribution to his family  and friends.” 
Having  found that informer privilege did not expire 
upon the informant’s death, the accused’s 
application for unvetted disclosure about the 
informant was dismissed. He was convicted of 
several offences and sentenced to seven years in 
prison. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions submitting, among 
other grounds, that the trial judge 
was wrong  to hold that informant 
privilege survives the death of the informant. But the 
Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding  that the trial 
judge’s ruling  was consistent with the law and the 
policy supporting the privilege: 
There are strong policy reasons for maintaining 
informer privilege beyond death.  Informer 
privilege arises out of the value that informers 
can have to a police investigation.  Informer 
privilege is necessary for two reasons: (1) 
protection; and, (2) encouraging others to do the 
same. ...
Extending the privilege beyond death continues 
to further the two goals mentioned in the 
foregoing  excerpt. Courts have recognized that 
protection does not just include the informer 
personally, but also the family and friends 
associated with that person. Also, it is critical for 
the police to be able to represent to the potential 
informers that informer privilege is “nearly 
absolute”.  The ability to maintain a single 
limited exception to the privilege seems to be 
consistent with the policy objective of 
encouraging people to come forward to assist 
the police. [references omitted, paras. 141-142]
Further, since the innocence at stake exception did 
not apply, there was no balancing  of interests to be 
determined in whether the privilege should be lifted. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“There are strong policy reasons for maintaining informer privilege beyond death. Informer 
privilege arises out of the value that informers can have to a police investigation. Informer privilege 
is necessary for two reasons: (1) protection; and, (2) encouraging others to do the same.”
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FLIGHT	 PLUS	 OTHER	 FACTORS	 
PROVIDE	 GROUNDS	 FOR	 
DETENTION
R. v. Atkins, 2013 ONCA 586
 
On New Year’s Eve, three uniformed 
police officers were driving  an 
unmarked police  van when they 
noticed the accused walking  along 
the sidewalk. He looked overdressed 
for the weather, wearing  a heavy, baggy winter coat, 
layered over a hooded sweatshirt.  Many other 
people nearby were wearing  light jackets and some 
had no jackets at all.  The accused appeared 
noticeably withdrawn (others around him were in a 
sociable mood)  and seemed to be hiding  in the 
crowd and skirting  building  walls. Deciding  to speak 
with him, an officer called “hey” out the van’s open 
window.  The accused glanced back but kept 
walking. When the  officer called “hey buddy” a little 
louder, the accused turned towards her. She waved 
for him to come over and then got out of the van 
along  with another officer. The 
accused took a couple of steps 
toward the officers as if he was 
going  to speak with them, but then 
started running  towards “a high 
crime district.”  A third officer gave 
chase and caught the accused, 
handcuffing  and searching  him. He 
was found to be carrying  a loaded 
9 mm handgun and was charged 
with possessing  a restricted firearm 
and two counts of possessing  a 
firearm while prohibited from 
doing so.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued he was arbitrarily 
detained under s. 9 of the Charter when 
the officer verbally commanded and 
waved at him to come over to them. But 
the judge found there was no evidence that the 
accused knew it was the police beckoning  him. 
Instead, the evidence suggested he did not realize it 
was the  police until the two officers got out of the 
van. At that point the accused ran before he could 
be stopped by officers. In the judge’s opinion, there 
was neither a physical or psychological detention. 
There was insufficient evidence that the accused 
believed he  was complying  with any police 
command when he took a couple of steps toward 
the van. Since he did not acquiesce or submit to any 
deprivation of liberty, there could be no detention. 
When the police did apprehend the accused they 
had a reasonable suspicion to detain him and the 
search that followed was justified on officer safety 
grounds. There  were no Charter  breaches and the 
handgun was admissible. The accused was 
convicted of the firearms offences.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that his 
interaction with police amounted 
to a psychological detention. In his 
view, there was “no question that 
[he] knew he was dealing  with the police (they were 
in full uniform), stopped as a result of a police 
demand, started to comply with their demand, and 
only  then fled.” But the Court of 
Appeal disagreed. Where an 
accused does not actually  comply 
with a demand and flees, there is 
no detention. Although the fact the 
accused ran may have been some 
evidence he believed he had no 
choice but to comply, there was no 
acquiescence or submission. Plus, 
he never testified on the voir dire 
to provide evidence of his 
subjective perception about his 
choices at the moment he was 
summoned by the officers. And, 
even if the accused recognized the people in the van 
as police officers and took two steps toward them in 
response to their beckoning, it was not shown that 
such words created a detention. Thus, there was no 
s. 9 breach during the sidewalk interaction. 
As for the detention following  the accused’s flight, “it 
was open to the trial judge to find that, in all the 
circumstances, the officers had the  requisite 
reasonable suspicion to detain the [accused].” The 
Court cautioned, however, that it was not suggesting 
that “merely because a person flees from the police, 
“While at the instance of the 
search, the [accused] could 
not reach any weapon 
because he was handcuffed, 
once the investigative 
detention ended the officer 
would have to remove the 
handcuffs and he would have 
been in immediate danger.”
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there  are grounds to detain the person.” In this case, 
there  was other information in addition to flight that 
could be relied upon by the officers to hold the 
requisite reasonable suspicion. Hence, there  was no 
s. 9 Charter breach when the accused was 
apprehended. 
As for the pat-down search that followed the 
detention and led to the discovery of the  gun, it was 
justified on officer safety  grounds. “The officers 
reasonably suspected that the [accused] was in 
possession of a weapon,” said the Court. “While at 
the instance of the search, the  [accused] could not 
reach any weapon because he was handcuffed, once 
the investigative detention ended the officer would 
have to remove the handcuffs and he would have 
been in immediate  danger.“ There was no s. 8 
Charter violation and the accused’s appeal from 
conviction was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
NO	 NEED	 TO	 PROVE	 CELL	 
PHONE	 CAPABLE	 OF	 RECEIVING	 
OR	 TRANSMITTING
R. v. Pizzurro, 2013 ONCA 584
A police officer saw the  accused 
driving  on a highway holding  a cell 
phone in his hand. It looked like he 
was either typing  or reading  the 
information on it. As a  result, he was 
charged under s. 78.1(1)  of Ontario’s Highway Traffic 
Act. 
Ontario Justice of the Peace
Although not disputing  that the cell 
phone he had in his hand was a hand-
held wireless communication device, the 
accused contended there was no 
evidence that it was operational. The JP rejected this 
argument, finding  it was not necessary for the  Crown 
to prove that what the accused was using  was an 
operating  cell phone. He was found guilty and fined 
$125.
Ontario Court of Justice
An appeal judge concluded that, as an 
essential element of the offence under s. 
78.1(1), the Crown was required to prove 
that the cell phone was capable of 
receiving  or transmitting  telephone communications, 
electronic data, mail or text messages. Since the 
Crown had failed to do so, the accused’s appeal was 
allowed and the charge was dismissed.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that it need not 
prove the cell phone was capable 
of receiving  or transmitting  in 
order to convict. The Court of 
Appeal agreed. First, s. 78.1(1)  applies to two kinds 
of devices:
 
(1) hand-held wireless communication devices 
(ie. cell phones) and 
(2) other devices prescribed by regulation. 
The Court found the capability requirement of 
receiving  or transmitting  telephone communications, 
electronic data, mail or text messages only  applied 
to prescribed devices and not cell phones, which are 
well known to be capable of doing  so. Furthermore, 
proving  that a cell phone held by a  driver was 
capable of receiving  or transmitting  would be an 
unreasonable burden:
The significant challenge for law enforcement is 
readily apparent. There can be no doubt that s. 
78.1(1) was targeted principally at cell phones.  
Observing a driver holding or using  a cell phone 
BY THE BOOK:
Wireless	 Communication	 Devices: 
Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act
s.  78.1(1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle 
on a highway while holding  or using  a hand-held 
wireless communication device or other 
prescribed  device that  is capable of receiving  or 
transmitting  telephone communications, electronic data, 
mail or text messages. 
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while driving would not be enough if this 
requirement existed.  For each case, the police 
would also have to find ways to immediately 
acquire and test the cell phone in order to 
determine that it was capable of receiving or 
transmitting.  I do not think that the legislature 
would have intended such a burden to be 
imposed by a section that is otherwise designed 
to operate in a simple and straightforward way. 
It would also be unreasonable for prosecution.  
Where for example the charge is using  a cell 
phone while driving, to require the Crown, once 
it has proven the use of a cell phone to 
communicate, to also prove that the cell phone 
that was being used to communicate is capable 
of doing so is unnecessary.  It would be 
unreasonable to read s. 78.1(1) to impose such a 
burden. [paras. 11-12]
 
Finally, the legislative purpose of s. 78.1(1)  “is best 
served by applying  the requirement that the device 
be capable of receiving  or transmitting  only to 
prescribed devices, but not to cell phones,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “Road safety and driver 
attentiveness are best achieved by entirely 
prohibiting  a  driver from holding  or using  a cell 
phone while driving. To hold out the possibility that 
the driver may escape the prohibition because the 
cell phone is not shown to be capable of 
communicating, however temporarily, is to tempt 
the driver to a  course of conduct that risks 
undermining these objectives.”
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the accused’s 
conviction restored.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
HOLDING	 CELL	 PHONE	 FOR	 
SUSTAINED	 PERIOD	 OF	 NOT	 
NECESSARY
R. v. Kazemi, 2013 ONCA 585
The accused, driving  home from 
work, was stopped at a  red light. A 
police officer saw her with a cell 
phone in her hand and she was 
ticketed under s. 78.1(1) of Ontario’s 
Highway Traffic Act (HTA).
Ontario Justice of the Peace
The accused said that the cell phone had 
dropped to the floor from the car seat 
when she braked. When she arrived at 
the red light she picked it up and that is 
when she was seen holding  it.  The JP found the 
accused’s admission that she had the cell phone in 
her hand established that she was holding  it for the 
purposes of s. 78.1(1). A conviction and $200 fine 
followed.
Ontario Court of Justice
On appeal the charge  was dismissed. 
The appeal judge concluded that there 
must be some sustained physical holding 
of the device in order to meet the 
“holding” requirement. In his view, the momentary 
handling  of the cell phone in this case was 
insufficient to prove the charge. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
Justice Goudge, speaking  for the 
unanimous Court of Appeal, 
interpreted the word “holding” in 
s. 78.1(1), which was not defined 
in the legislation, to take on its ordinary meaning: 
“to have a grip  on” or “to support in or with the 
hands”.  There is no requirement that the cell phone 
be in one’s hand for a sustained period of time. This 
interpretation is also consistent with the HTA’s road 
safety objective and the legislature’s purpose on 
enacting the provision:
“Road safety and driver attentiveness are 
best achieved by entirely prohibiting a 
driver from holding or using a cell phone 
while driving. To hold out the possibility 
that the driver may escape the prohibition 
because the cell phone is not shown to be 
capable of communicating, however 
temporarily, is to tempt the driver to a 
course of conduct that risks undermining 
these objectives.”
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Road safety is best ensured by a complete 
prohibition on having a cell phone in one’s hand 
at all while driving. A complete prohibition also 
best focuses a driver’s undivided attention on 
driving. It eliminates any risk of the driver being 
distracted by the information on the cell phone.  
It removes any temptation to use the cell phone 
while driving. And it prevents any possibility of 
the cell phone physically interfering  with the 
driver’s ability to drive.  In short, it removes the 
various ways that road safety and driver attention 
can be harmed if a driver has a cell phone in his 
or her hand while driving.
The interpretation of “holding” offered by the 
appeal judge requires that there be some 
sustained physical holding.  Any holding for a 
shorter period of time, with the accompanying 
risks to road safety and driver attention, would 
be exempt from the prohibition. With respect, I 
do not think this accords with the ordinary 
meaning of the word.  Nor does it properly 
reflect the object of the HTA or best achieve the 
legislature’s purpose in enacting the section.  
Moreover such an interpretation would leave the 
uncertainty of how long the physical holding 
must be sustained to be caught by the provision. 
It would create the enforcement challenge of 
requiring continued observation of the driver for 
that period of time if the prohibition is to be 
effective. [paras. 14-15]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the accused’s 
conviction restored.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SOPHONOW	 
RECOMMENDATIONS	 ARE	 NOT	 
BINDING	 LEGAL	 DICTATES
R. v. Yigzaw, 2013 ONCA 547
During  the investigation of two 
robberies some 2 ½ weeks apart, 
which included common victims, 
police conducted photographic line-
ups. One of the  officers conducting 
the line-ups was an investigating  officer and 
therefore knew which photograph depicted the 
accused. Four photographic line-ups, one for each 
suspect, were created and shown to each victim. 
Three of the four victims went through the 
photographic array sequentially while  a fourth 
reviewed all the photographs before making  a 
selection. The photographic line-up  procedure  was 
recorded on DVD. All four victims selected the 
accused’s photo as being one of the robbers.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The DVDs of the photographic line-up 
procedure were entered as exhibits at 
trial and the  Crown played each of the 
four victims’ selections of the accused for 
the jury. After all of the evidence was heard, the 
accused was convicted of multiple counts of 
kidnapping and robbery.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
convictions arguing, among  other 
grounds, that the guilty verdicts 
were unreasonable because, in 
part, the  procedure used in conducting  the photo 
line-up was flawed and therefore the evidence was 
incapable of supporting  a conviction. In his view, 
the investigating  officer knew the accused was a 
suspect and which photo in the lineup  portrayed 
him. As well, the victims were allowed to go through 
the photographs and compare them rather than 
being  presented with them sequentially. These 
aspects, he submitted, were identif ied as 
shortcomings in line-up procedures as detailed in 
the Sophonow Inquiry.
Justice Simmons found the photographic line-up 
procedure was imperfect. However, she noted the 
DVDs of the photographic line-up  identifications 
were available for the jury’s consideration. Plus, 
there  was no suggestion the investigating  officer’s 
conduct was anything  other than neutral. As well, 
the accused never argued that the manner of 
presenting  the photographs to the victims deprived 
their pre-trial identifications of any probative value. 
The Court of Appeal also noted that the Sophonow 
Inquiry recommendations were “neither conditions 
precedent to the admissibility of eyewitness 
testimony nor binding  legal dictates for the 
assignment of weight.”
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The accused’s submission that the guilty  verdicts 
were unreasonable was rejected. However, the 
accused’s convictions were set aside and a new trial 
was ordered. The Court of Appeal found the trial 
judge erred in his instructions to the jury on the 
frailties of eyewitness identification by not 
cautioning  the jury  about an eyewitness’s failure to 
identify  distinguishing  features, the minimal weight 
to be given to in-dock identifications or instructions 
on how to properly evaluate the photographic line-
up evidence.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
REQUEST	 TO	 EXIT	 CAR	 
FUNCTIONAL	 EQUIVALENT	 OF	 
SOBRIETY	 TEST
R. v. Visser, 2013 BCCA 393
 
At about 11 pm police received a 911 
call reporting  erratic driving  by a 
“drunk driver.” The caller had 
followed a vehicle for 12 km and had 
observed it travelling  under the speed 
limit, swerve repeatedly and nearly hit a retaining 
wall along  the  side of the road. A police officer 
stopped a  vehicle matching  the description and 
licence plate  number provided. The officer, however, 
did not personally observe the vehicle  being  driven 
in an unsafe or improper manner. The driver pulled 
over immediately upon the officer activating  his 
emergency lights. The officer approached the driver’s 
side of the vehicle and spoke with the  accused, the 
sole occupant, through the rolled-down window. 
The officer detected an odour of alcohol emanating 
from inside the vehicle but could not determine 
whether it was coming from the accused.
The accused was directed to exit the car and 
accompany the officer back to the police vehicle. 
When he got out, the accused dropped his wallet, 
spilling  its contents onto the highway. He walked 
back to the police vehicle where he denied that he 
had anything  to drink after noon that day. The officer 
detected a smell of alcohol on the  accused’s breath, 
noted that his speech was slurred, face was flushed, 
eyes were bloodshot and he was swaying  slightly 
while standing. Based on these observations, the 
officer made an ASD demand under the Criminal 
Code. Upon failing, the accused was “detained” for 
impaired driving, advised of his right to counsel and 
a breath demand was made under s. 254(3). He was 
transported to the police station, spoke to a lawyer, 
provided breath samples over the legal limit and 
released on a promise to appear. He was charged 
with impaired driving and over 80mg%.
 
British Columbia Provincial Court
 
The Crown abandoned the over 80mg% 
charge because of an irregularity in 
service of the certificate of analysis. On 
the impaired driving  charge, however, 
the accused was found guilty. The judge admitted 
the police officer’s observations of the accused after 
he was directed to exit the vehicle as evidence to 
convict on the impaired driving.
 
British Columbia Supreme Court
 
The accused argued that the trial judge 
er red by admit t ing  the of f icer ’s 
observations as evidence and relying  on 
them to conclude the Crown had proven 
impaired driving  beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
appeal judge found that when the accused was 
pulled over he was under investigative detention 
and was entitled to his s. 10(b)  Charter right to 
counsel. However, the police did not have to 
provide the s. 10(b) warning  during  the roadside 
stop  if the evidence gathered after the accused was 
directed to exit his vehicle was only used to 
establish reasonable grounds for the breathalyzer 
demand and not, in the absence of a  s.10(b) 
warning, used as evidence to incriminate on the 
impaired driving  charge. In his view, the officer’s 
observational evidence was obtained by “compelled 
direct participation.” He was gathering  evidence 
about the accused’s level of sobriety in a  criminal 
investigation (possible impaired driver)  by directing 
him to exit his vehicle, accompany him back to the 
police cruiser and respond to questions about his 
alcohol consumption. “Prior to providing  the 
requisite Charter advice, the officer is entitled to 
make observations of the driving  or physical 
appearance of the driver and, in fact, rely upon it as 
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part of the  evidence available to prove any charges,” 
said the appeal judge. “But once the driver is invited 
to participate in an activity intended to provide an 
opportunity for the officer to gather evidence, such 
evidence can only be utilized to provide the grounds 
for a breath demand unless the appropriate Charter 
advice is given and, if desired, an opportunity to 
contact counsel is first provided.” The accused’s 
conviction was set aside and a new trial was 
ordered.  
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
The Crown appealed, arguing  the 
officer’s roadside observations were 
admissible  at trial for the purpose 
of incriminating  the accused on the 
impaired driving  charge, and not just limited for the 
purpose of providing  reasonable grounds for a 
breath demand. Justice Smith, writing  the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment, noted that a 
police officer may stop a motorist 
if authorized under statutory 
authority or their common law 
duties to protect life and prevent 
harm. Statutorily, “there is an 
interlocking  scheme of provincial 
and federal legislation that 
authorizes police officers to 
detain motorists suspected of 
drinking  and driving  for the 
purpose of assessing  their level of 
sobriety.” 
When a motorist is stopped at the roadside they are 
detained, which triggers s. 10(b). However, the right 
to counsel may be suspended for the purposes of 
roadside screening  measures (such as ASD testing, 
physical sobriety tests and direct questioning  about 
the driver’s consumption of alcohol) if the  use of the 
evidence gathered is limited to establishing 
reasonable grounds for the breathalyzer demand. If 
police action after a roadside stop involves measures 
amounting  to the  compelled direct participation of a 
detained motorist in order to obtain evidence of 
impairment, the observations are only admissible  at 
trial to establish reasonable grounds for the 
breathalyzer test. If, however, police actions are 
measures undertaken while carrying  out other 
authorized duties that incidentally produce evidence 
of impairment they are admissible at trial to prove 
guilt. The difference between these two purposes 
can be difficult to draw and will require careful 
examination.
Thus, the purpose of the officer’s direction to exit the 
vehicle after the roadside stop will determine 
whether the observational evidence gathered is or is 
not admissible for the purpose of incriminating  the 
motorist of impaired driving  in the absence of giving 
them their s.10(b) right to counsel. Justice Smith 
stated:
 
If the only purpose is to investigate the motorist’s 
level of sobriety to determine if a criminal 
offence has been committed, then in my view 
the officer’s directions amount to screening 
measures that are the functional equivalent of 
physical sobriety tests and/or the ASD test. In 
such circumstances, the only purpose of the 
directions can be to assess the motorist’s level of 
insobriety; the pr inciples 
derived from [case law] would 
dictate that such evidence may 
only be used at trial for the 
limited purpose of establishing 
reasonable grounds for a 
breathalyzer demand. To admit 
the evidence obtained in this 
manner to prove guilt on a 
criminal charge would, in my 
view, amount to an unjustifiable 
infringement of the motorist’s s. 
10(b) right to counsel.  [para. 
64]
 
And further:
 
A helpful way to apply the rationale of these 
decisions might be for a court first to determine 
the investigating officer’s focus or purpose at the 
roadside stop. If the evidence establishes that the 
officer formed the opinion from his or her initial 
interaction with the motorist, that it was 
necessary to remove the driver immediately from 
the road for safety reasons, then the investigator’s 
observations of the driver made thereafter would 
be available at trial to prove guilt on a 
subsequent criminal charge. However, if the 
evidence establishes that the purpose of the 
investigator’s direction to a motorist to exit his 
vehicle was to determine whether grounds 
existed to make a breathalyzer demand, then the 
“If the only purpose is to 
investigate the motorist’s level of 
sobriety to determine if a criminal 
offence has been committed, 
then in my view the officer’s 
directions amount to screening 
measures that are the functional 
equivalent of physical sobriety 
tests and/or the ASD test.”
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observational evidence obtained thereafter 
would not be available to prove the guilt for a 
criminal offence. This might be a fine distinction 
b u t I w o u l d s u g g e s t a n i n t e l l i g i b l e 
one. [references omitted, para. 69]
 
The Court of Appeal refused to restrict the limited-
use exception of evidence of impairment to actual 
physical sobriety testing  (including  an ASD test) and 
responses to direct questions about the motorist’s 
consumption of alcohol. It rejected the Crown’s 
assertion that evidence obtained as a result of a 
police officer’s direction to exit a  vehicle, 
accompany the officer and answer questions were 
mere “passive observations” intended to assess the 
motorist’s level of sobriety and should not be held to 
be  evidence obtained by compelled direct 
participation:
 
I find it difficult to appreciate the difference 
between compelling a motorist to exit his 
vehicle for the purpose of continuing an 
impaired driving investigation and compelling a 
motorist to exit his vehicle in order to gather 
evidence of his sobriety that may later be used in 
to prosecute the driver for impaired driving. In 
both instances, the detained motorist does not 
have the benefit of the s. 10(b) right to counsel, 
and, in the normal course, must comply with the 
officer’s directions. [para. 68]
 
Here, the officer was authorized to stop the 
accused’s vehicle  based on his common law duty  to 
investigate a  complaint of erratic driving  by  a 
suspected drunk driver. Since the officer had not 
personally observed any unsafe  or improper driving 
and the accused had pulled over his vehicle 
appropriately, the officer had no legal authority 
under British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle  Act to direct 
him to exit his vehicle. Once the officer detected the 
odour of alcohol emanating  from the vehicle, the 
investigation into erratic driving  morphed into an 
investigation of impaired driving  under the Criminal 
Code. 
Based on the evidence, there was no other 
authorized investigative activity. The only  reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the  officer’s request to 
exit the vehicle was to assess whether there was a 
basis upon which the officer could make a 
breathalyzer demand. The officer’s observational 
evidence from the moment he directed the accused 
to exit his vehicle was inadmissible to prove the 
accused’s guilt on the impaired driving  charge. 
However, the Court noted the case may have been 
decided differently if the officer believed the 
accused, while he was seated in the  vehicle, was a 
menace to public safety and that is why he was 
requested to exit the vehicle. The Crown’s appeal 
was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“I find it difficult to appreciate the difference between compelling a motorist to exit his vehicle 
for the purpose of continuing an impaired driving investigation and compelling a motorist to exit 
his vehicle in order to gather evidence of his sobriety that may later be used in to prosecute the 
driver for impaired driving. In both instances, the detained motorist does not have the benefit of 
the s. 10(b) right to counsel, and, in the normal course, must comply with the officer’s 
directions.”
“If the ... officer formed the opinion from his or her initial interaction with the motorist, that it was 
necessary to remove the driver immediately from the road for safety reasons, then ... observations 
of the driver made thereafter would be available at trial to prove guilt on a subsequent criminal 
charge. However, if ... the purpose of the ... direction to a motorist to exit his vehicle was to 
determine whether grounds existed to make a breathalyzer demand, then the observational 
evidence obtained thereafter would not be available to prove the guilt for a criminal offence.”
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MEASURES	 DEPLOYED	 DURING	 
TRAFFIC	 STOP	 MUST	 BE	 
REASONABLY	 NECESSARY
R. v. Adaiken, 2013 ABCA 333
Shortly after midnight a Calgary 
police officer pulled over a vehicle 
for speeding. The officer told the 
driver that he was speeding  and 
obtained his driver’s information. 
When the officer returned to his police car to write a 
speeding  ticket, the driver became irate and angry 
because  he did not think he had been speeding. The 
driver left his vehicle and began walking  towards the  
police car. The officer stepped out of his car, stood 
behind the driver’s door with his hand near his gun 
and instructed the driver to return to his car. When 
the driver ignored the direction, the officer further 
instructed him to get back into his car, or to move to 
the sidewalk, otherwise he would be arrested.  The 
driver returned to his car and was served a speeding 
ticket.
 
Calgary Police Service
 
After the driver filed a complaint with the 
Calgary Police Service, the Chief of Police 
ruled that the officer exceeded his 
authority when he told the driver that he 
would be arrested if he did not return to his car. An 
official warning was placed on the officer’s file.
 
Alberta Law Enforcement Review Board
 
The officer appealed the Chief’s 
ruling  to Alberta’s Law Enforcement 
Review Board (LERB), arguing  that 
he acted appropriately in the 
circumstances.  The LERB affirmed the Chief’s 
decision, concluding  that the  driver maintained a 
reasonable distance, was not verbally abusive, 
stopped when instructed to do so and did not 
physically confront the officer.  Since the driver did 
not commit an offence, the  necessary conditions for 
an arrest did not exist. Thus, the LERB concluded 
that the officer exceeded his authority when 
threatening arrest.
 
Alberta Court of Appeal
 
The officer argued that the LERB 
erred by concluding  that he acted 
unlawfully by directing  the driver 
to get back into his car or face 
arrest. The Court of Appeal determined that the  
police authority to direct an individual’s movements 
during  the course of a traffic stop required an 
examination of the common law and the police 
power to detain:
 
A police officer may only arrest (or lawfully 
threaten to do so) if given such authority under 
statute or at common law.
 
During traffic stops, police officers have certain 
statutory powers. For example, an officer may 
require a driver to bring  his vehicle to a stop, 
furnish information, and remain stopped until 
permitted by the officer to leave: s 166(2) of the 
Traffic Safety Act ... .  Officers also have the 
authority to direct traffic: ss 58, 61, and 101(1) 
of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road 
Regulation (Regulation) ... 
 
It is not disputed that police have the power to 
detain a motorist for a traffic violation.  
However, there are no specific statutory 
provisions dealing  with the power of a police 
officer to direct an individual’s movements 
during  the course of a traffic stop. We must 
therefore look to the common law in asking 
whether the power to detain extends to limiting 
a motorist’s movements and ordering that he/she 
stay in their vehicle. [references omitted, paras. 
8-10]
Recently, a majority  of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in R. v Aucoin, 2012 SCC 66 concluded that the 
manner in which the police exercise a detention 
must be justified. The question is not whether the 
police can detain a driver after stopping  them for a 
regulatory infraction, but whether the police are 
justified in exercising  the detention as they did in the 
circumstances. As the Alberta  Court of Appeal put it, 
“the issue on this appeal is not whether the  [officer] 
had the authority to tell the driver to return to his car 
or face arrest, but whether the exercise of this power 
was reasonably necessary in light of the totality of 
the circumstances.” Since the Chief of Police  wanted 
to reconsider this matter, the  Court of Appeal agreed 
to send it back but offered the following guidance: 
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The determination of whether the [officer] was 
justified in threatening  to arrest the driver for 
refusing to return to his vehicle and stay there, 
involves balancing the seriousness of the risk to 
the public or individual safety with the liberty 
interests of members of the public. It is important 
to consider the duty being performed and the 
nature and extent of the liberty being  interfered 
with. 
 
In this case, the Chief of Police must weigh the 
fact that the [officer] was performing his duty to 
enforce traffic safety, with the level of imposition 
on the driver’s liberty – restricting  his physical 
movements to his car for a few moments. This 
necessarily entails asking  whether there were 
other reasonable means by which the officer 
could have ensured his safety and enforced his 
duty. 
 
As the Supreme Court observed [in] Aucoin; “In 
the context of a straightforward motor vehicle 
infraction, it will be the rare case in which it will 
be reasonably necessary to secure a motorist in 
the rear of a police cruiser.”
 
However, the relevant determination must focus 
on the specific nature of the situation.  In this 
case, the [officer] states that it was reasonable 
for him to believe that he was about to be 
assaulted by the driver who continued to 
advance on him after being commanded to get 
back into his car and thus the threat to arrest was 
necessary in the circumstances.  Whether the 
officer had at his disposal less intrusive measures 
to ensure his safety and the continuation of his 
duty to issue the traffic ticket is a question of fact 
to be left to the Chief of Police.
 
We would like to add a final comment. We 
agree with the court in Aucoin that it would be 
rare case in which it was reasonably necessary 
for a police officer arrest a motorist at a routine 
traffic stop. It seems to us that training police 
officers to be less aggressive and more courteous 
at traffic stops would avoid most troublesome 
situations and defuse others. [references omitted, 
paras. 14-18]
 
The matter was remitted back to the Chief of Police 
for reconsideration.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
PURSE	 A	 ‘THING’	 TO	 BE	 
SEARCHED	 UNDER	 WARRANT	 
R. v. Le, 2013 BCCA 442
 
The police obtained a CDSA search 
warrant for an apartment and 
arrested their target after she left the 
premises. When police executed the 
warrant they found two women and 
three  children inside. The police made arrangements 
for these remaining  occupants, who were not 
suspects,  to leave so the search could be completed 
unencumbered. As one of the women left, she 
picked up her purse from the kitchen table. The 
purse was taken from her, searched and police  found 
crack cocaine in it. She was charged with possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
 
British Columbia Supreme Court
 
The judge concluded that the search 
warrant eliminated any objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in any 
things located in the apartment. The purse, 
one such thing, was an item in the place searched 
that was separate from the accused’s person. Picking 
up  the purse  in the midst of the warrant’s execution 
did not create an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy when there was none while  the purse sat 
on the table. The search of the purse did not interfere 
with the accused’s privacy rights and there was no 
Charter breach. And, even if there was a s. 8 
violation, the judge would have ruled the crack 
cocaine admissible under s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted of the  lesser and included offence of 
possessing  a controlled substance, the judge being 
not satisfied she possessed it for the purpose  of 
trafficking.
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
The accused argued, in part, that 
the trial judge erred in concluding 
that the scope  of the search 
warrant extended to her purse. 
However, the Court of Appeal rejected this 
submission, holding  that the search warrant 
extended to the purse after it had been picked up. 
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Even though the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her purse (a different 
finding  than the trial judge), “a search of the purse 
while it was on the table was not unreasonable 
because  it was a ‘thing’ as listed in the search 
warrant,” said Justice Chiasson. “At the time the 
search warrant initially was executed it was merely 
an object in the premises.”   The purse  was a “thing” 
that the police  were legally authorized to search. The 
warrant’s reach to the  “thing” (purse) did not end just 
because  the accused picked it up and declared 
ownership. Since there was no challenge to the 
search warrant or the manner of search, the  search 
of the purse was authorized by law and was 
reasonable. As the  Court of Appeal noted, “[the 
search] did not become unreasonable simply 
because the [accused] picked up her purse.” 
There was no Charter breach and it was therefore 
unnecessary to consider s. 24(2).
 
A Word of Warning
 
The Court of Appeal cautioned that if a person was 
already carrying  a purse when the warrant was 
executed, the outcome may have been different. If it 
was carried, a purse search might be considered a 
search of the  person rather than a search of a  “thing” 
under the authority of the warrant. As the Court of 
Appeal stated:
 
It is important to identify what this case concerns 
and what it does not concern.  It does not 
concern the search of a purse that was on the 
person of the [accused] at the time the search 
warrant initially was executed or variants on that 
fact pattern. These might engage a consideration 
whether the search warrant extended to the 
purse as a “thing” in the dwelling-house or 
whether it did not because searching such an 
object would be the search of a person.  The 
question is best left to another day.
 Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“[A] search of the purse while it was on the 
table was not unreasonable, because it was a 
‘thing’ as listed in the search warrant. At the 
time the search warrant initially was executed 
it was merely an object in the premises.”  
“This Court emphatically rejects any suggestion that the Court’s sentencing 
posture should be relaxed to reflect a peace officer’s voluntary acceptance 
of a risk that he or she may be a target of violence in the line of duty. If 
there is a risk of violence and a potential for harm, then the Court must 
recognize the vulnerability of the peace officer and compensate for it by 
ensuring an increased measure of protection through the sentencing 
process.
 
The peace officer provides an essential public service. A deliberate attempt 
to harm those performing a public duty enhances the moral culpability of 
such an attack. The peace officer’s willingness to serve and protect others 
and to risk themselves in doing so is a reason to increase, and not reduce, 
the sentencing tariff for crimes of extreme violence directed against the 
peace officer.”
The Honourable Mr. Justice Kilpatrick in R. v. Utye, 2013 NUCJ 14 at paras. 36-37.
A Judge’s View on Protecting Peace Officers & Promoting Public Safety
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Foundational Courses:
Intelligence Theories and  Applications
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Intelligence Communications
Specialized Courses:
Competitive Intelligence
Analyzing Financial Crimes
Tactical Criminal Intelligence 
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence
Entrance Requirements:
Proof of completion of bachelor degree;  OR
A minimum of two years of post secondary 
education plus a minimum of five years
of progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information.  Applicants must also write a 
500 – 1000 word essay on a related topic of 
their choice OR
Applicants who have not completed a 
minimum of 2 years post-secondary 
education must have eight to ten years of 
progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information (Dean/Director discretion).  
Applicants are required to write a 500-1000 
word essay on a related topic of their 
choice.
For detailed requirements please visit the 
JIBC Website.
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